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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Eighth Circuit Holds ADA Compensatory Damages
Claims Survive Death
Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co., Inc., 846 F.3d 979
(8th Cir. 2017).
This past January, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the United States District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas and held a claim for
compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) survives the death of an aggrieved party. The case
arose after Griffin Construction terminated employee Semmie
John Guenther, Jr. in 2013. When he was originally diagnosed
with prostate cancer in 2012, the company granted his request
for three weeks of leave from work to receive treatment.
However, in 2013, when he learned that the cancer had spread
and he requested an additional three weeks of leave to undergo
radiation therapy, Griffin Construction fired him and
immediately cancelled his insurance policies.
While Guenther timely filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
he died before the agency completed its administrative process
and issued a right-to-sue letter. The special administrator of
Guenther’s estate filed suit under Title I of the ADA and a
section of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA).1 Griffin
Construction argued the claims did not survive death in their
motion to dismiss, and the District Court agreed. Noting the
“difficult question of state law,” the District Court found that the
federal common law provided for application of Arkansas’s tort
survival statute.2 Judge Timothy Brooks entered judgment on
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (West 2016).
2. Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 3d 665, 667 (W.D. Ark. 2016),
rev’d, 846 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2017).
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the pleadings for Griffin Construction, concluding Guenther’s
ADA claim abated at death.
Writing for the Eighth Circuit, Chief Judge William Jay
Riley reversed the District Court. Judge Riley first addressed
how Congress could have instructed the judiciary whether
federal claims survive a complainant’s death. Not only is there
no general federal survival statute for federal-question cases,
there is nothing on claim abatement within the text of the ADA.
Even though 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) instructs courts to fill gaps
with state law when state law is not inconsistent with federal
law, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Judge Brooks that the statute
does not apply to the ADA. Relying on a Tenth Circuit case, the
court decided that federal common law should govern the issue
of ADA claim survival since Congress has not expressed a
contrary intent.3 Rather, Congress’s intent in passing the ADA
was to provide a comprehensive national mandate with “clear,
strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards” for addressing
disability-based discrimination.4
In considering the ADA’s intent, the opinion makes two
points. First, state law should not be incorporated where it
would “frustrate” a federal program’s intent. The abatement of
ADA claims would pose “a special threat to enforcement”
because the very health issue that led an employee to file their
claim could lead to or cause the individual’s death before the
administrative process runs its course (as was seen in Guenther’s
case). Second, unlike state law, a uniform federal rule would
ensure consistent and evenhanded application of the ADA.
Griffin Construction argued that applying state statutes of
limitation was similar to applying state survivorship laws, and
the tort survival language contained in ACRA should control.
The Eighth Circuit flatly rejected this notion, faulting the
“analogy to comparing apples to oranges.” In concluding that
federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine
survivorship of an ADA claim, the Eighth Circuit gave
Guenther’s administrator and future plaintiffs’ estates the green
3. Smith v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 834 (10th Cir. 1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2) (2009).
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light to bring ADA claims in the place of the decedent.
However, the court did not provide any view as to “whether a
claim for punitive damages would survive,” and cautioned that it
was not answering the question “whether a claim under any
other federal scheme warrants a uniform rule of survivorship.”
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Federal Judge Permanently Enjoins State Authorities
from Enforcing Anti-Begging Law
Rodgers v. Bryant, No. 4:16-cv-775-BRW (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22,
2016) (order granting preliminary injunction).
In late November, United States District Judge Billy Joe
Wilson granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state
from enforcing a section of its loitering statute. Under Arkansas
Code Annotated § 5-71-213(a)(3), a person commits a class C
misdemeanor if he or she “[l]ingers or remains in a public place
or on the premises of another for the purpose of begging.”5 In
enjoining the law, Judge Wilson concluded that the anti-begging
section “infringe[d] on the freedom of speech guaranteed under
the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Arkansas
filed the case on behalf of two plaintiffs: one disabled veteran in
Garland County and one homeless male in Benton County.
Both plaintiffs were previously cited for violating § 5-71213(a)(3). Plaintiff Michael Andrews Rodgers was arrested
once and cited four times while holding up a sign that identified
him as a veteran. After getting convicted in Garland County
District Court, the Garland County Circuit Court found the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the charges. However, with the
law in effect in other parts of the state, Rodgers believed the law
continued to have a direct and chilling effect on his right to
freedom of speech. The other plaintiff, Glynn Dilbeck, was
arrested for holding up a sign asking for money alongside a
roadway exit in Northwest Arkansas. While his charge was
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecuting attorney, he too alleged
that his fear of further criminal action had a chilling effect on his
First Amendment right. Their complaint, filed against the
Director of the Arkansas State Police, maintained that the anti-

5. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213 (West 2016).
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begging section of the loitering statute was both
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.6
The District Court found the plaintiffs had standing to bring
their First Amendment claims, noting that begging is
constitutionally-protected. The plaintiffs’ experiences, wrote
Judge Wilson, underscored the real threat of being charged for
begging. The District Court’s order then addressed the
Defendant’s concerns that federal courts should abstain and
defer to the authority of state courts to interpret state law when a
narrow construction by state courts may avoid constitutional
concerns. While the Arkansas Supreme Court has not had the
opportunity to consider § 5-71-213(a)(3), Judge Wilson declined
to abstain noting he could “imagine no interpretation shy of
metaphysical contortions that would save the anti-begging law
from constitutional concerns.”
As to the vagueness challenge, the District Court agreed
with Defendant that persons of ordinary intelligence understand
what is meant by the term “begging.” Citing The New American
Heritage Dictionary, the District Court relied on the term to
mean asking for money or soliciting alms. However, the District
Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that § 5-71-213(a)(3) was not
narrowly tailored to meet constitutional muster. Noting that the
section broadly applied to “begging in all places, at all times, by
all people,” Judge Wilson determined that the anti-begging
section violated the First Amendment. While his court order left
untouched the other subsections of § 5-71-213, the injunction
will prevent future arrests or citations from being issued by the
Arkansas State Police.

6. Complaint at 1, Rodgers v. Bryant, No. 4:16-cv-775-BRW (E.D. Ark. Oct. 21,
2016).
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Arkansas Supreme Court Overturns Birth Certificate
Ruling for Same-Sex Couples
Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, 505 S.W.3d 169.
In a narrow decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court threw
out Pulaski Circuit Court Judge Tim Fox’s ruling that
temporarily allowed married same-sex couples to get the names
of both spouses on their children’s birth certificates without a
court order. The case was brought by three couples whose
children were conceived through artificial insemination by
anonymous donors. The six plaintiffs filed their suit in circuit
court seeking (1) a declaration that the refusal to issue birth
certificates with the names of both spouses was unconstitutional;
(2) a finding that certain statutory provisions were
unconstitutional; (3) an order enjoining the Arkansas
Department of Health (ADH) from refusing to list the names;
and (4) an order requiring ADH to issue corrected birth
certificates naming both spouses. The central question of the
children’s rights relating to their birth certificates was not
argued by the parties or addressed by the circuit court. The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Josephine Hart, focused
instead on interpreting two portions of the Arkansas Code
relating to the registration of children’s births.7
The majority held that the circuit court erred in concluding
that the case was controlled by res judicata. Nathaniel Smith,
the Director of the ADH, was a party in a previous case that
granted injunctive relief to same-sex couples.8 However, the
court noted the absence of the words “birth certificates” from the
previous order and held that the “language in the [] orders would
not have placed Smith on notice that he needed to appeal those
orders to this court and raise on appeal arguments related to the
overbreadth of the injunctive relief granted and to the issuance
of birth certificates.”
7. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-18-401(e)-(f), 20-18, 406(a)(2) (West 2016).
8. Smith v. Wright, No. 60CV-13-2662 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2014); Smith v.
Wright, No. 60CV-13-2662 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2015).
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The majority then turned to the circuit court’s reliance on
the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,9
declaring the decision inapplicable to same-sex birth certificates.
Arkansas Code Annotated § 20-18-406(a)(2), which establishes
when the State Registrar of Vital Records can issue new birth
certificates, uses the language “person to be legitimated.” The
circuit court interpreted this phrase in light of Obergefell to
cover minor children of any married couple. The majority
disagreed, reasoning the statute relies on the biological
relationship of the parents to the child. It noted that Obergefell
did not address the question presented, rather it mentioned birth
certificates only once. Pointing to the second statute, which the
circuit court also found unconstitutional, the majority referenced
the dictionary meanings of “husband” and “father.” When
viewed in context of these definitions, “the statute centers on the
relationship of the biological mother and the biological father to
the child, not on the marital relationship of husband and wife.”
In addressing the couples’ facial challenge to the two
statutes, the majority cited the state’s “important governmental
objective” in listing biological parents on birth certificates,
concluding it “does not violate equal protection to acknowledge
these basic biological truths.” The majority faulted the circuit
court for conflating marriage, parental rights and vital records.
Relying heavily on an affidavit from the Registrar of Vital
Records, Melinda Allen, the majority placed a strong emphasis
on this government interest in documenting the nexus between
biological parents.
Former Chief Justice Howard Brill and Justice Rhonda
Wood both concurred in part and dissented in part. Beginning
with lyrics from Bob Dylan’s classic, “The Times They Are aChangin’,” Justice Brill’s opinion highlighted the unique powers
held by each branch of government, and it concluded that all
three branches must protect the constitutional rights of its
citizens. Justice Brill also detailed the implications of Judge
Fox’s ruling through three different scenarios. In the first
scenario, two married couples are unable to naturally conceive a
9. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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baby. The wife in the heterosexual couple gives birth through
artificial insemination, as does one of the women in the
homosexual couple. However, only the heterosexual couple is
entitled to a birth certificate because the statute includes the
word “husband.” In the second scenario, both couples use
artificial insemination to have a baby, but neither couple is
married. As both are barred from using section 9-10-201(a),
they must instead rely on a different statute that allows for a new
birth certificate when there is evidence proving “that the person
has been legitimated.”10 Justice Brill agreed with the majority
that Judge Fox erred in giving a court-ordered definition to that
phrase, while acknowledging that future direction from the
legislative or executive bodies is necessary to “effect appropriate
and required changes.” His dissent questioned the majority’s
reliance on Melinda Allen’s affidavit, noting that the ADH
practice described in the affidavit run contrary to the language of
existing Arkansas statutes—further underscoring the need for
legislative or executive attention.
In the third scenario, both couples are married and seek to
adopt. Under Obergefell, the statute is gender-neutral and both
married couples are able to obtain a birth certificate. These
scenarios, Justice Brill concluded, provide a snapshot of the
“variations that may be presented by the changes in society and
the changes in reproductive methods.” In referencing the
musical legend and recent Nobel laureate Bob Dylan one last
time, he reminded the other branches of government to “heed
the call.”
Writing in dissent, Justice Wood discussed how the court
could utilize the prudential-mootness doctrine to withhold relief
and instead conduct a full evidentiary hearing. Characterizing
the case as “fluctuating and underdeveloped,” she highlighted
the need for the legislature to review and rewrite the two statutes
in light of Obergefell. A remand would allow the legislature “to
either amend the statute to apply neutrally to same-sex
marriages or base the benefit on something other than marital
status.” The federal doctrine, she argued, is essential when key
10. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2) (West 2016).
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circumstances in the course of litigation forestall meaningful
relief. Both parties, she pointed out, acknowledge that material
facts have changed.
Justice Paul Danielson dissented in full, contending that
listing a parent’s name on a birth certificate is “a benefit
associated with marriage.” In Obergefell, the Supreme Court
listed “birth and death certificates” as those benefits “linked” to
marital status. The majority here, Danielson writes, errs in
favoring biological relationships over marital ones.
As of publication, two of the three couples have filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court.11

11. Pavan v. Smith, 2016 Ark. 437, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb 13, 2017) (No.
16-992).

